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My interest in politics started during my high school years. At 13 I got hooked on the Venezuelan 
political scenario with the same intensity as most adults. It is not usual for a teenager to be 
interested in politics, but the impact of the 1998 Venezuelan presidential election was so significant, 
the coverage by media so widespread, that it was practically inevitable that I would become 
enthralled in the outcome. “How does who you are and where you stand in relation to others shape 
what you know about the world?” By raising this question, David Takacs (2002) introduces the 
importance of positionality to knowledge production. Positionality provides a way to understand 
how objective or subjective researchers are during knowledge production (Lave & Wenger, 1991). I 
can firmly say that the representations portrayed in Venezuela’s mainstream media built up my 
character, and shaped the analytical approach that I follow today as a scholar. 
I believe that reflecting on our positionality is a process that requires deep introspection. 
Positionality has been conceptualized as a core factor in data collection (Ganga & Scott, 2006). And 
by being consciously reflective during the research process, not only do we become aware of new 
considerations for analysis, but we also open up possibilities of knowing our positionality better. 
This process of reflection also involves critical engagement that is directly connected to our 
experiences. Etherington (2004) argues that critical engagement: 
  
allows us to check for distortions in our interpretations that might be based on past 
experiences held outside our full awareness, or based on indoctrination within our personal 
or social cultures that we may have accepted without question since early childhood (p.29).  
 
These perceptual frameworks determine and contribute to our understanding of issues that 
could arise during research. Indeed, we must recognize the internal and external aspects that drive 
us towards the questions we ask, the analysis we produce, and the representations we make. 
When I decided to pursue my Master degree, I knew that I wanted to produce meaningful work 
about the political situation and the transformation of media spheres in my country. I argue that 
Venezuela’s political structure has set a precedent in the region in the last years, and it is an 
example of how unlimited power may disrupt the most honest pursuits and the fortune of an entire 
nation. In this essay, I discuss my positionality as a male communicator who grew up and was 
educated during the major political shift that Venezuela has experienced over the past 18 years. I 
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reflect on how those experiences shaped my academic and professional endeavours. In particular, I 
discuss the challenge of balancing objectivity and positionality when studying a country and a 
context that I feel passionate about. I also suggest that it takes first-hand experience to really 
understand what life is like in Venezuela today, which makes me question the arguments of 
outsiders who celebrate the revolution without having to live in it. 
 
Growing up in Revolutionary Times 
 
The Bolivarian Revolution started when Hugo Chávez took office in 1999. It represented a complete 
transformation of the Venezuelan political system, and it was received with enthusiasm and also 
doubt. For the first time in forty years, an exhausted electorate saw in Chávez an option that 
promised to empower citizens by detaching the country from the predominance of neoliberal 
structures that had influenced the country for decades.  
During the neoliberal period, the main political parties, Acción Democrática (AD - Democratic 
Action) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI - Independent Political 
Electoral Organization Committee), held on to power without any strong opposition. These parties 
were highly institutionalized, and they had developed alliances that satisfied the particular goals of 
their leaders and members. Although there was a commitment to representative democracy, their 
bipartisan control allowed AD and COPEI to command institutions such as the Supreme Court and 
the Congress, regardless of the party that was occupying the presidency (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003). 
There was no real political competition and society had become numb to this dynamic. The alliance 
between these parties was carefully crafted to avoid rivalry or civic mobilizations that might 
disrupt the political order (Linz & Stepan, 1996). During this period, Venezuelans did not talk about 
their situation in terms of anti-imperialism. Bilateral relations with capitalist countries such as the 
United States were somewhat effective for both countries, and the Venezuelan leadership did not 
have a strong nationalist discourse.  
But behind the scenes, an unknown military officer named Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías decided to 
pursue a political change by organizing movements among military corps who were discontent 
with the old neoliberal model established by AD and COPEI. This is how the Revolutionary 
Bolivarian Movement 200 was formed. Under Chávez’s direction, this group organized two coups 
d’état in 1992 that aimed to remove President Carlos Andrés Pérez from his residence at Palacio de 
Miraflores. These attempts put Chávez in jail and failed to ignite immediate change, but he was 
resolute in his intentions. His efforts had made him a hero among marginalized groups and those 
who did not embrace the agenda of AD and COPEI. This is because: 
 
The political ascendency of Chávez is deeply intertwined with the struggle over neoliberalism. 
The self-destruction of Venezuela’s so-called ‘stable democracy’ occurred through the 1990s 
as social polarization and turmoil emerged in response to the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) and the United States backed efforts to impose neoliberal austerity, including major 
rioting in Caracas over the implementation of structural adjustment policies.  
(Albo, 2006, p.1) 
 
This may be true, but it is also true that Chávez’s actions laid bare the shortcomings of the 
neoliberal system which had become unsustainable in Venezuela. Structural adjustments harmed 
the bi-partisan oligopoly of AD and COPEI. After 1992, the deterioration of the old order had 
officially begun and it was unstoppable.  
So, although Chávez ended up in jail, his acts sparked social turmoil which destabilized the 
political order. Radical ‘Chavistas’ started to organize groups to support him. This created a mass of 
political capital which paid off when Chávez was released from jail. He traveled around the country 
promoting his populist agenda, and building up credibility with the electorate. Learning from his 
mistakes, Chávez surrounded himself by experienced leftist politicians and peers from the military 
forces who were patriotic defenders of the nation. They helped him structure his ambitions and 
crafted strategies that eventually blew up the traditional political apparatus, this time not from the 
shadows of insurrection. Chávez’s political party Movimiento Quinta República (MVR – the Fifth 
Republic Movement) was the first civic-military alliance in Venezuelan history, and it formed the 
platform that allowed him to win the presidential election in 1998 (Albo, 2006). Chávez defeated 
media projections, detractors, traditional parties and experienced candidates to become the new 
President of Venezuela.  
From early on, political polarization between opposition parties and Chávez supporters was 
acute. Before Chávez’s administration, the political system of Venezuelan had well-structured 
political institutions (Villa, 2005), however they were quite rigid and controlled by elites, so they 
did little to acknowledge the voices, interests or needs of people without power, poor communities 
or independent movements. That changed once Chávez took office with the creation of the Partido 
Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV - United Venezuelan Socialist Party) and the implementation of 
policies that promoted institutional changes. These changes were advanced through Chávez strong 
ties to the military, and mobilization of popular sectors. The impact of these reforms was so strong 
that within the next years the influence of AD and COPEI was greatly diminished. Although new so-
called ‘democratic’ parties arose, none of them could compete with the PSUV.  
Chávez also began to reorganize the country around his ideals. A new Constitution was approved 
in a popular referendum on December 15, 1999. It changed the name of the country to the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, wiped out the Congress, and extended the presidential term from 
five to six years with the possibility of reelection, which meant that Chávez’s presidency was likely 
to last for 13 years. The reason for extending the term and allowing immediate reelection was that 
‘rebuilding’ Venezuela would take more than five years. However, during most of his presidency, 
Chávez indicated that rebuilding the country could last until 2021 (Wilpert, 2003). Later in 2009, 
using his power as a President, and with most legislative and electoral institutions under his control, 
Chávez introduced a project to hold a referendum on whether the Constitution should be amended 
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to eliminate term limits for president, governors, mayors and deputies for the National Assembly. 
On February 15, 2009, the referendum was approved by 54% of the electorate.  
The role of the military was also strengthened in the new Constitution, which should not be 
surprising considering Chávez’ military background. Military officers were given the right to vote, 
and military promotions were approved directly by Chávez. This was the opportunity for Chávez to 
control the military force and place active military officers in different public institutions. Some of 
those officers were part of the coup attempts that Chávez plotted in 1992, such as Jesse Chacón, 
Diosdado Cabello and Francisco Árias Cardenas. During Chávez’s presidency, they were designated 
Ministers, Governors, and Vice-presidents, and changed roles according to Chávez’s needs. The civil 
rights given to the military blurred the line that divided the average citizen from the armed forces. 
The combination of a Chavista military fiercely loyal to the Bolivarian Revolution, armed militias 
with no military training and a fiery rhetoric promoted by the socialist leadership have been 
particularly dangerous for the country. These groups have joined forces to defend the Bolivarian 
Revolution against any detractors. 
Although these new changes were seen as drastic by some sectors of society, the inclusion of 
popular referendums in the Bolivarian Constitution promoted the ideal of participatory democracy. 
Four types of referendums were outlined: consultative, rescinding, approving and recall, which can 
be activated by collecting signatures from at least 20 percent of the electorate. This ‘21st Century’ 
participatory model was a cutting-edge innovation that set Venezuela’s politics apart from the 
neoliberal models of most Western democracies.  
As a result of this social, political and economic upheaval, the way Venezuelans consume 
information has changed radically in the past 18 years. Before Chávez, private media enterprises 
ruled Venezuela’s media landscape vis-á-vis publicly regulated media concessions. Private media in 
Venezuela was commanded by wealthy corporations and businessmen, who were part of an 
authoritarian neoliberal society (Park & Curran, 2000). Free market policies capitalized on 
“celebrity banal culture, game show aesthetics, and a politics of precarity, control, and mass 
surveillance” (Giroux, 2015, para. 2). Chávez’s new participatory democracy required a new 
informational infrastructure to link the government to the people.  
Chávez’s 2005 Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Rádio y Televisión (Ley RESORTE - Law for Social 
Responsibility in Radio and Television) imposed restrictions on private media corporations, and 
promoted public service broadcasting that would support the democratization of the state media 
system. Restrictions on private media increased and reached their maximum in May 2007 when the 
transmission rights of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV) were revoked. Before Chávez, public media 
had just one channel: Venezolana de Televisión (VTV) which struggled to bypass the hegemony of 
the private media. From 2002 to 2009, the state funded and financed four more public stations: 
Televisora Venezolana Social (TVES) which replaced RCTV, Visión Venezuela (ViVe), Asamblea 
Nacional Televisión (ANTV) and Ávila TV. The government started to shape the future of public 
television channels by delegating control to working-class communities, trade unions and 
independent producers, which has paved the way for “non-commercial, non-capitalist media 
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production” (Artz, 2009). By 2015, there were 516 private, 98 public and 262 community access FM 
stations. For AM stations, 171 were private and 21 public. On the other hand, the number of 
television broadcasters increased to 198 private, 96 public and 44 community television stations 
(Conatel.gob.ve, 2015). 
Besides the transformation of public and private media, the Venezuelan government has actively 
supported alternative media by reassigning transmission concessions to sectors that promote 
grassroots communication. Here the intent was to give voice to segments of society that formerly 
had no way of representing themselves in the public sphere. Meanwhile, the internet and new 
communication channels such as Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, blogs, and websites had provided a 
platform for those sectors of society that had a voice before but lost it due to political intervention. 
Although online journalism has provided an escape from Venezuela’s media chaos, the internet has 
not escaped Chávez’s influence. In 2009, Chávez signed Decree-law No. 6,649 which establishes 
internet purchases as “superfluous or luxury spending” and not a priority for the nation. 
Additionally, President Nicolás Maduro cut the budget allocated to sumptuous expenses by 20 
percent in 2014, pulling back projects to improve the infrastructure of the telecom sector. 
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Venezuela 
has the slowest broadband speed of the region (1.9 Mbps in 2016).  
In sum, the Chavista government carried out a full overhaul of the Venezuelan media system, 
emphasizing public and community media and taking power away from private media. While these 
reforms were portrayed as necessary for popular participation in the management of the 
Venezuelan state, the truth is that Chávez capitalized on them to establish a communicational 
hegemony. Although Chávez’s detractors (many of whom were harmed by these changes) rejected 
this dramatic shift, the truth is that the new Bolivarian communicational hegemony replaced the old 
communicational hegemony of private media. 
At a very young age, I had the chance to experience all of these changes and the shifting balance 
of power between Chávez and his opposition. Much of what has happened in Venezuela is idealized 
or vilified by external commentators in the news or in academic circles. But these commentators 
have the luxury of offering general impressions or using Venezuela as a case study to support their 
ideological agendas, without having to live out the reality of what is happening in the country. The 
Venezuelan revolution changed the dynamic of an entire society, separating friends, and dividing 
families. Personally, the hardest part of it are the enmities that have emerged with friends and 
family. I have relatives and acquaintances that support the Bolivarian Revolution. Now, some of 
them living elsewhere in the world, enjoy the benefits of capitalism and spend their dubiously 
acquired wealth. These experiences and relationships have shaped my research questions, and they 
have also shaped the person who I am today. They make me want to challenge power in Venezuela 
from my own personal standpoint. 
 
First Hand Experiences of Media Reform in Venezuela 
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As an undergraduate student, I developed a full-fledged interest in the Venezuelan political context 
with a particular focus on the interplay between media and politics. Although I knew that my future 
career would be directly affected by the changes taking place in the country, I was determined to 
thrive and pursue my personal goals. This turned out to be harder than anticipated.  
During my undergraduate degree, I landed my first job as a journalist for a popular tabloid in 
Caracas. It was exciting to be “on call” to chase down the news. Even though I enjoyed this 
experience, I was appalled to discover that unconfirmed information was often used to create 
headlines. I continually asked myself how, in a country where political polarization determines 
pretty much everything, this type of irresponsible practice could be allowed to continue. Over time I 
have come to understand that this type of journalism has promoted a culture of urgency, which is 
symptomatic to the heated economic and sociopolitical condition of Venezuela, and intends to fill 
the gaping holes torn open by an ideological divide. Also, these practices were a reaction to 
rampant repression and censorship that reached its maximum when RCTV was forced to close.  
Through my work, I was directly connected to colleagues from different media outlets, including 
colleagues who worked at RCTV, when the transmission rights were revoked. As a journalist, as a 
student and as a Venezuelan who did not—and does not—support the government, I lived this 
episode with intensity. I attended all the protests, was threatened by the police and watched my 
colleagues lose their jobs. Following this, my role as a journalist lost direction. Fear of political 
retaliation dramatically reduced my options and opportunities. At that moment, I decided to change 
my path to corporate communications. Although I was ready to embrace new challenges, I always 
tried to stay connected with politics. However, politics in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution is 
always a constant fight against the system. Very few are capable of working in this compulsive 
environment, much less thrive. Defending what you stand for in Venezuela requires more than 
passion; you need courage and willingness to tackle the shortcomings, risking all what you have. 
When your integrity and safety are challenged, it may be necessary to evaluate your priorities. 
These experiences were paramount to my growth as a professional and scholar, and have helped 
to define my research interests. I have had a chance to experience how media functions in 
Venezuela, and I have seen the role of politics in shaping the media. My challenge now is to think 
about how I will recount the story of media and politics in Venezuela. How does who I am and 
where I stand in relation to others shape what I know about the world? How will it shape the story I 
tell about those experiences? 
 
A Primary Position on the Revolution 
 
A careful reader will discern my positionality as a Venezuelan citizen with a strong political stance 
against the current administration. However, I hope to prevent my personal biases from colouring 
my research excessively. It is important for me to establish trust with my peers, and to do so on the 
basis of quality research about the Venezuelan media. During my literature review, I found that 
much of what is written about the Venezuelan media, is written by outsiders who are distant from 
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the ‘on the ground’ reality. Some accounts are quite biased, such as the one provided by 
communications scholar Lee Artz, which is heavily shaped by his leftist positionality.  
From my perspective, despite the growth in media outlets in Venezuela over the past years, and 
their representation of public, private, citizen and alternative sectors, the country suffers from a 
profound lack of pluralism. I would like to analyze what has happened in Venezuela, rather than 
just criticize. I aim to explain this situation from my perspective as an insider—as a person who 
lived these changes and can leverage his identity to explain them further. I believe that making a 
distinction between the field (media) and my home (Venezuela) could help me to explore my 
findings as both insider and an outsider, striking a balance between objective and subjective 
research (Gilbert, 1994; Mullings, 1999).  
I aim to address issues such as the role data and statistics play in the media as political tool to 
influence marginalized sectors of society. Additionally, I would like to study the interplay between 
traditional and online journalism, and how the latter has been used as an alternative outlet to voice 
the opinion of those sectors that have lost spaces of participation in the reformed media landscape. 
Understanding these dynamics raises questions regarding freedom of speech, equality and 
pluralism not just in Venezuela, but in the entire Latin America region, which has been influenced 
by the changes happening in Venezuela.  
As a graduate student, I always aim to engage in meaningful work, and this already is a 
significant responsibility. But my positionality makes my work that much more meaningful. I am 
the only Venezuelan in my class, and this gives me a degree of authority and responsibility for the 
work I produce. For that reason, this project is important to me, and I hope that it will provide a 
new perspective on the Venezuelan media that has not been addressed before. 
Sharing my work with authentic audiences motivates me to produce an analysis that can be 
impactful. Although my experiences are valuable, I do not want them to over-determine my 
research. By understanding the role of media in Venezuela and outlining possible solutions, I shall 
address Venezuelan’s desire for justice. I hope my research can assist Venezuela in achieving 
human rights, cooperation, compassion, communality and nonviolence (Hamelink, 2011). 
Regardless of our research interests, our positionality merges objectivism and subjectivism, and 
they must be brought together to complement each other. My research must reflect the facts, but it 
must also offer an analysis, and if possible, these two things can come together to provide a solution 
for the media situation in Venezuela. I cannot claim to speak for all Venezuelans, but perhaps my 
ideas can start a conversation, and in this way we can begin to move towards new changes that will 
resolve the current difficulties faced by the country. I’m hopeful that the media can be part of these 
changes and play a role in a transition to a new democracy. 
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